

Löb's Theorem and Provability Predicates in Coq

Second Bachelor Seminar Talk

Janis Bailitis

Universität des Saarlandes

Advisors: Dr. Yannick Forster, Dr. Dominik Kirst

Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Gert Smolka

Programming Systems Lab

June 6, 2024

What is Löb's theorem?

Problem (Henkin, 1952)

- Assume sufficiently strong formal system, e.g. Peano arithmetic
- There is a sentence S expressing own provability

Question: S independent or provable?

- Kreisel 1953: It depends on provability predicate
 - Only inspected restricted set of provability predicates
- Löb 1955: S is provable
 - But for a strong notion of provability predicate

Theorem (Löb's theorem, 1955)

Let $\text{Pr}(x)$ express provability internally in T . For all sentences φ , we have

$$(T \vdash \text{Pr}(\overline{\varphi}) \dot{\rightarrow} \varphi) \text{ implies } (T \vdash \varphi).$$

$\text{Pr}(x)$ expresses provability **externally** in T if at least $T \vdash \varphi$ implies $T \vdash \text{Pr}(\overline{\varphi})$

- Internal provability predicates require much technical detail
- Can we do this more abstractly in the spirit of Kirst & Peters (2023)?
 - Löb isolated abstract axioms
 - Crucial ones became known as Hilbert-Bernays-Löb derivability conditions
 - Hide most technical details

Hilbert-Bernays-Löb (HBL) derivability conditions (see Löb, 1955)

We say that $\text{Pr}(x)$ satisfies

- **necessitation** if $T \vdash \varphi$ implies $T \vdash \text{Pr}(\overline{\varphi})$
 - **internal necessitation** if $T \vdash \text{Pr}(\overline{\varphi}) \rightarrow \text{Pr}(\overline{\text{Pr}(\overline{\varphi})})$
 - **the distributivity law** if $T \vdash \text{Pr}(\overline{\varphi \rightarrow \psi}) \rightarrow \text{Pr}(\overline{\varphi}) \rightarrow \text{Pr}(\overline{\psi})$
-
- Key behind Gödel's second incompleteness theorem
 - Many similar conditions analysed by Kurahashi (2020, 2021)
 - Also used in mechanisations with proof assistants (Isabelle)
 - Paulson (2015) proves first two; uses hereditarily finite set theory
 - Assumed without proof by Popescu & Traytel (2021)

The Hilbert-Bernays-Löb derivability conditions

We use Peano arithmetic (PA).

Hilbert-Bernays-Löb (HBL) derivability conditions (see Löb, 1955)

We say that $\text{Pr}(x)$ satisfies

- **necessitation** if $\text{PA} \vdash \varphi$ implies $\text{PA} \vdash \text{Pr}(\overline{\varphi})$
- **internal necessitation** if $\text{PA} \vdash \text{Pr}(\overline{\varphi}) \rightarrow \text{Pr}(\overline{\text{Pr}(\overline{\varphi})})$
- **the distributivity law** if $\text{PA} \vdash \text{Pr}(\overline{\varphi \rightarrow \psi}) \rightarrow \text{Pr}(\overline{\varphi}) \rightarrow \text{Pr}(\overline{\psi})$
- We analysed how far Church's Thesis for arithmetic (CT_{PA})¹ takes us
 - Gives more abstract formula
 - Investigate which axioms hold

¹Formalised for first-order arithmetic by Hermes and Kirst 2022, proven consistent by Kirst and Peters 2023.

Defining a first provability candidate

Axiom (CT_{PA})

For every $f : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$, there is a formula $\varphi(x, y)$ such that for all $n : \mathbb{N}$

$$\text{PA} \vdash \forall y. \varphi(\bar{n}, y) \leftrightarrow y = \overline{f n}.$$

Lemma (Weak representability, cf. Hermes & Kirst (2023))

Let $P : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{P}$ be enumerable. There is a formula $\varphi(x)$ such that for all $n : \mathbb{N}$

$$P n \text{ iff } \text{PA} \vdash \varphi(\bar{n}).$$

We inspect $\lambda\varphi. \text{PA} \vdash \varphi$, enumerability mechanised by Forster, Kirst & Smolka (2019).

Corollary

We obtain $\text{Pr}(x)$ such that $\text{PA} \vdash \varphi$ iff $\text{PA} \vdash \text{Pr}(\overline{\varphi})$.

$\text{Pr}(x)$ is **external** provability predicate.

A problem arises

We obtained $\text{Pr}(x)$ such that $\text{PA} \vdash \varphi$ iff $\text{PA} \vdash \text{Pr}(\overline{\varphi})$.

Theorem (Gödel's second incompleteness theorem, 1931)

Suppose $\text{Pr}(x)$ is an internal provability predicate for PA. Then, $\text{PA} \not\vdash \neg \text{Pr}(\overline{\perp})$.

HBL derivability conditions imply this theorem via Löb's Theorem.

Definition (Mostowski's modification, 1965 (modified slightly¹))

We set $\text{Pr}'(x) := \text{Pr}(x) \wedge x \neq \overline{\perp}$.

Lemma

$\text{PA} \vdash \varphi$ iff $\text{PA} \vdash \text{Pr}'(\overline{\varphi})$, i.e. $\text{Pr}'(x)$ is an external provability predicate.

Lemma

$\text{PA} \vdash \neg \text{Pr}'(\overline{\perp})$.

¹This formulation is mentioned by Bezboruah & Shepherdson (1976).

Formal proofs in Peano Arithmetic: Getting internal

Problem

- $\text{Pr}'(x)$ is external provability predicate
 - We showed $\text{PA} \vdash \neg \text{Pr}'(\perp)$
 - If Pr' satisfied the HBL conditions, we would have $\text{PA} \not\vdash \neg \text{Pr}'(\perp)$
- Not all external provability predicates satisfy the HBL conditions

Towards a solution

PA should reason about proofs: Find formula $\text{Prf}(x, y)$ expressing 'x is a proof of y'.

Remark (Formal proofs, cf. [Rau10])

A proof of φ is a nonempty list $\ell = [\psi_1, \dots, \psi_n] : \mathcal{L}(\mathbb{F})$ with $\varphi = \psi_n$ s.t. for each i

- ψ_i is an axiom of PA or
- there are $j, j' < i$ such that ψ_i follows from $\psi_j, \psi_{j'}$ by modus ponens.

Obtaining the required functions inside Peano Arithmetic

If PA has a formula $\text{Prf}(x, y)$ capturing proofs, $\text{Pr}(y) := \dot{\exists}x. \text{Prf}(x, y)$ is internal.

- Gödel, Boolos, Smith and Rautenberg define $\text{Prf}(x, y)$ from scratch
 - E.g. they explicitly define list formulas such as $\text{len}(x, y)$ for length inside PA

Our approach: Use CT_{PA} to obtain these formulas abstractly

Next problem (terms and numerals), simplified

1. We know: For all $\ell : \mathcal{L}(\mathbb{F})$ that $\text{PA} \vdash \dot{\forall}z. \text{len}(\bar{\ell}, z) \leftrightarrow z = \overline{|\ell|}$
2. Suppose that $\text{Prf}(x, y)$ uses $\text{len}(x, z)$ internally for some z
3. When we destruct $\dot{\exists}x. \text{Prf}(x, y)$, we only know $\text{len}(x, z)$ for some **terms** x, z
4. x not necessarily a **numeral**: We cannot apply property from 1.

Introducing the required functions through axioms

New idea needed: Add functions and constants to PA.

| | | |
|-----------------|-------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| $[]$ (nil) | $ l $ (length) | $l \# l'$ (append) |
| $x :: l$ (cons) | $l[i]$ (indexed access) | $x \dot{\rightarrow} y$ (implication) |

These functions should have standard properties, we assume them through axioms.

Required properties, not exhaustive

- $PA \vdash |[]| = 0$
- $PA \vdash \dot{\forall} l x. (x :: l)[0] = x$
- $PA \vdash \dot{\forall} l l'. |l \# l'| = |l| + |l'|$
- $PA \vdash \dot{\forall} i l l'. i < |l'| \dot{\rightarrow} l'[i] = (l \# l')[i + |l|]$
- $PA \vdash \dot{\forall} l x. |x :: l| = S|l|$
- $PA \vdash \dot{\forall} i l x. (x :: l)[Si] = l[i]$
- $PA \vdash \dot{\forall} i l l'. i < |l| \dot{\rightarrow} l[i] = (l \# l')[i]$
- For all formulas φ, ψ , we have $PA \vdash \overline{\varphi \dot{\rightarrow} \psi} = \overline{\varphi} \dot{\rightarrow} \overline{\psi}$

The Hilbert-Bernays-Löb derivability conditions

Hilbert-Bernays-Löb derivability conditions

We say that $\text{Pr}(x)$ satisfies

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- **the distributivity law** if $\text{PA} \vdash \text{Pr}(\overline{\varphi \dot{\rightarrow} \psi}) \dot{\rightarrow} \text{Pr}(\overline{\varphi}) \dot{\rightarrow} \text{Pr}(\overline{\psi})$

Reminder (Formal proofs)

A proof of φ is a nonempty list $\ell = [\psi_1, \dots, \psi_n] : \mathcal{L}(\mathbb{F})$ with $\varphi = \psi_n$ s.t. for each i

- ψ_i is an axiom of PA or
- there are $j, j' < i$ such that ψ_i follows from $\psi_j, \psi_{j'}$ by modus ponens.

Proof (of the distributivity law).

Let ℓ, ℓ' be proofs of $\varphi \dot{\rightarrow} \psi$ and φ , respectively. Then, $(\ell \# \ell') \# [\psi]$ proves ψ . \square

The Hilbert-Bernays-Löb derivability conditions

Hilbert-Bernays-Löb derivability conditions

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Reminder (Formal proofs)

A proof of φ is a nonempty list $\ell = [\psi_1, \dots, \psi_n] : \mathcal{L}(\mathbb{F})$ with $\varphi = \psi_n$ s.t. for each i

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 - there are $j, j' < i$ such that ψ_i follows from $\psi_j, \psi_{j'}$ by modus ponens.
-
- Necessitation not obvious: How to formalise ND-derivations this way?
 - Need equivalent system with only modus ponens and axioms \rightsquigarrow Hilbert system

Deriving internal necessitation

Definition (Σ_1 -formulas, Kleene (1943) & Mostowski (1947))

Let φ and $\psi(x_1, \dots, x_n)$ be formulas such that

- $\varphi = \dot{\exists}x_1 \dots \dot{\exists}x_n. \psi(x_1, \dots, x_n)$ and
- ψ does not use quantifiers (except bounded ones, e.g. $\dot{\forall}y < x$)

We say that φ is a Σ_1 -**formula**.

We can show that our internal provability predicate is Σ_1 .

Theorem (Provable Σ_1 -completeness, cf. [Rau10])

Let φ be a Σ_1 -formula. Then $\text{PA} \vdash \varphi \dot{\rightarrow} \text{Pr}(\overline{\varphi})$.

- In the proof, provability on open formulas is needed (e.g. $\text{Pr}(\overline{\varphi(x_1, \dots, x_n)})$)
- For instance, we want to obtain $\text{Pr}(\overline{\varphi(\overline{42}, \dots, \overline{42})})$ from $\text{Pr}(\overline{\varphi(x_1, \dots, x_n)})$ by substitution

Achievements and further work

We have

- Mechanised the abstract proof of Löb's Theorem from the HBL conditions
- Mechanised the Diagonal Lemma as well as important corollaries such as Gödel's first incompleteness theorem
- Analysed why external provability predicates are too weak for Löb's Theorem
- Developed a rough understanding of internal provability predicates

We will

- Formalise the needed Hilbert system for the necessitation proof
- Understand internal necessitation sufficiently
- Finish mechanising the results in Coq
- Optional: Resolve identified weaknesses of Coq library for first-order logic [Kir+22]

Thanks for your attention.

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Problem

Let $\varphi(x), \psi : \mathbb{F}$.

We used $\varphi(\overline{\psi})$ for ‘substituting some encoding of ψ for x in φ ’.

ψ is not a **number**, but a **formula** $\rightarrow \overline{\psi}$ not a numeral.

Typical issue. Gödel faced it himself.

Remark (Gödelisation)

There are functions $\text{göd} : \mathbb{F} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$, $\text{göd}^{-1} : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{F}$ inverting each other.

$\varphi(\overline{\psi}) \rightsquigarrow \varphi(\overline{\text{göd}(\psi)})$

We also assume a Gödel numbering $\text{göd}_{\mathcal{L}}$ for lists of formulas; $\varphi(\overline{\ell}) \rightsquigarrow \varphi(\overline{\text{göd}_{\mathcal{L}}(\ell)})$

Technical background: External provability is too weak

We obtained $\text{Pr}(x)$ such that $\text{PA} \vdash \varphi$ iff $\text{PA} \vdash \text{Pr}(\overline{\varphi})$.

Definition (Mostowski's modification, 1965 (modified slightly))

We set $\text{Pr}'(x) := \text{Pr}(x) \wedge x \neq \overline{\perp}$.

Lemma

$\text{PA} \vdash \varphi$ iff $\text{PA} \vdash \text{Pr}'(\overline{\varphi})$.

Proof.

- Suppose that $\text{PA} \vdash \varphi$
 1. Observe that $\text{PA} \vdash \text{Pr}(\overline{\varphi})$
 2. In the meta-level, we know that PA is consistent, so $\varphi \neq \overline{\perp}$ (and thus $\overline{\varphi} \neq \overline{\perp}$)
 3. PA decides equalities: $\text{PA} \vdash \overline{\varphi} = \overline{\perp}$ or $\text{PA} \vdash \overline{\varphi} \neq \overline{\perp}$
 4. By soundness and 2., $\text{PA} \not\vdash \overline{\varphi} = \overline{\perp}$
 5. From 1.,3. and 4., conclude $\text{PA} \vdash \text{Pr}(\overline{\varphi}) \wedge \overline{\varphi} \neq \overline{\perp}$

Technical background: External provability is too weak

We obtained $\text{Pr}(x)$ such that $\text{PA} \vdash \varphi$ iff $\text{PA} \vdash \text{Pr}(\overline{\varphi})$.

Definition (Mostowski's modification, 1965 (modified slightly))

We set $\text{Pr}'(x) := \text{Pr}(x) \wedge x \neq \overline{\perp}$.

Lemma

$\text{PA} \vdash \neg \text{Pr}'(\overline{\perp})$.

Proof.

We argue inside PA.

- After introducing and destructing, have to show $\text{PA}, \text{Pr}(\overline{\perp}), \overline{\perp} \neq \overline{\perp} \vdash \perp$
- By applying the assumption, we are left to show $\text{PA}, \text{Pr}(\overline{\perp}), \overline{\perp} \neq \overline{\perp} \vdash \overline{\perp} = \overline{\perp}$
- This follows by reflexivity

□

Technical background: External provability is too weak

Lemma (Weak representability, cf. Hermes & Kirst (2023))

Let $P : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{P}$ be enumerable. There is a formula $\varphi(x)$ such that for all $n : \mathbb{N}$
 $P n$ iff $PA \vdash \varphi(\bar{n})$.

Recap

- We proved $\text{Pr}'(x)$ weakly represents $\lambda\varphi. PA \vdash \varphi$
- We showed $PA \vdash \neg \text{Pr}'(\bar{\perp})$

We can show: If $\text{Pr}'(x)$ was internal, then $PA \not\vdash \neg \text{Pr}'(\bar{\perp})$,
for instance via Gödel's second incompleteness theorem.

Takeaway

Weak representability does not suffice to define internal provability predicates.

Technical background: CT_{PA} is too weak

Axiom (CT_{PA})

For every $f : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$, there is a formula $\varphi(x, y)$ such that for all $n : \mathbb{N}$

$$PA \vdash \dot{\forall} y. \varphi(\bar{n}, y) \leftrightarrow y = \overline{f n}.$$

Example

Suppose the successor function $S : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ is represented by $\varphi_S(x, y)$.

Question: Can we derive, for all $n : \mathbb{N}$, that $PA \vdash \varphi_S(\bar{n}, S \bar{n})$?

Yes!

- Use property of φ_S : $PA \vdash S \bar{n} = \overline{S n}$
- By definition of numerals, $PA \vdash S \bar{n} = \overline{S n}$, easy to finish

Question: Can we derive $PA \vdash \dot{\forall} x. \varphi_S(x, S x)$?

No!

- Introduce x : $PA \vdash \varphi_S(x, S x)$. No way to continue as x not a numeral

Technical background: CT_{PA} is too weak

Axiom (CT_{PA})

For every $f : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$, there is a formula $\varphi(x, y)$ such that for all $n : \mathbb{N}$

$$PA \vdash \forall y. \varphi(\bar{n}, y) \leftrightarrow y = \overline{f n}.$$

- Suppose we define $\text{Prf}(x, y)$ using formulas resulting from CT_{PA} , s.t. e.g. $\varphi(x, z)$ appears in $\text{Prf}(x, y)$
- We have to show $PA \vdash (\exists x. \text{Prf}(x, \overline{\varphi \rightarrow \psi})) \rightarrow (\exists x'. \text{Prf}(x', \overline{\varphi})) \rightarrow \exists x''. \text{Prf}(x'', \overline{\psi})$
- After introducing, we know $\varphi(x, z)$ and $\varphi(x', z')$ for some terms z, z'
- x, x' not necessarily numerals: Defining property from CT_{PA} not applicable

Formal proofs: Spelling out (some of) the details

Reminder (Formal proofs)

A proof of φ is a nonempty list $\ell = [\psi_1, \dots, \psi_n] : \mathcal{L}(\mathbb{F})$ with $\varphi = \psi_n$ s.t. for each i

- ψ_i is an axiom of PA or
- there are $j, j' < i$ such that ψ_i follows from $\psi_j, \psi_{j'}$ by modus ponens.

Definition (Provability predicate)

Let $Ax(x)$ be a formula capturing axioms of PA (details to be investigated).

$$\text{Prf}(x, y) := (\exists z. |x| = Sz \wedge x[z] = y) \wedge \forall i. i < |x| \rightarrow \text{WellFormed}(x, i)$$

$$\text{WellFormed}(x, i) := Ax(x) \vee \exists j j'. j < i \wedge j' < i \wedge x[j] = x[j'] \rightarrow x[i]$$

Technical background: Provability on open formulas

Problem

- Let φ be a formula with free variables x_1, \dots, x_n , i.e. $\varphi = \varphi(x_1, \dots, x_n)$
- $\Pr(\overline{\varphi(x_1, \dots, x_n)})$ is closed. x_1, \dots, x_n are hard-coded in encoding
- We want to obtain $\Pr(\overline{\varphi(42, \dots, 42)})$ from $\Pr(\overline{\varphi(x_1, \dots, x_n)})$ by substitution

First attempt to circumvent this issue, cf. [Rau10]

- It is possible to define an n -place function sb_n in PA satisfying
$$\text{PA} \vdash sb_n(\overline{\varphi(x_1, \dots, x_n)}, t_1, \dots, t_n) = \overline{\varphi(t_1, \dots, t_n)}$$
for any n -bounded formula φ and terms t_1, \dots, t_n .
- Then, $\Pr_n(x, y_1, \dots, y_n) := \Pr(sb_n(x, y_1, \dots, y_n))$ has desired property
- Not satisfactory due to dependency on n

Paulson formalised yet another approach in the Isabelle proof assistant.